We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of …rms'reputations when …rms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single …rm, in the case of joint projects a …rm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations a¤ect …rms' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.
Introduction
Firms often engage in joint projects, i.e., projects that involve the contributions of two or more parties. In the case of a joint project, …rms are only partially responsible for the project and others may not be able to precisely evaluate each party's contribution to the performance of the project. Consider, for example, the dispute between Ford and Firestone, following the deadly accidents involving Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone ATX tires in the summer of 2000. Was it merely a case of poor tires, as claimed by Ford, or was the design of the Explorer partly responsible for the accidents, as Firestone asserted? The strong controversy that surrounded this dispute and …rms'attempts to pass the blame to their partner illustrate how di¢ cult it is to assign responsibility for performance in joint projects. This di¢ culty makes the reputational dynamics in the case of joint projects rather intricate. In this paper, we study the reputational implications of situations where two …rms implement a joint project, sharing the responsibility for its performance. In particular, we address the following questions: How do …rms'reputations evolve following the implementation and performance of a joint project? How do the qualities and reputations of the potential partners a¤ect the decision to participate in joint projects? How do reputation considerations a¤ect the choice between individual and joint implementation of projects, when both alternatives are feasible?
Although most of the insights generated in this article apply to many di¤erent settings where reputation is important, for concreteness we focus on the situation where …rms produce "experience goods", i.e., goods whose performance consumers can only infer after their purchasing decision. Formally, we consider an adverse selection model where …rms face the opportunity to implement a joint project through a partnership. We de…ne a partnership broadly as any situation where two or more parties contribute to the performance of a given project. Thus, our de…nition of partnership encompasses not only joint-ventures, but also vertical relationships where, for example, a …rm outsources the production of an important component of a product to another …rm as in the case of Ford and Firestone. In our model, …rms' qualities are observable only by …rms. Consumers hold beliefs about …rms' qualities. These beliefs are updated upon observing …rms' decision to form a partnership and the performance of the jointly implemented project. We model a …rm's reputation as the expected value of its quality, according to consumers'beliefs. Firms'reputations are crucial because consumers base their purchasing decisions on them. In contrast, …rms'true qualities are important because they a¤ect the performance of the projects in which …rms participate and, thereby, …rms' future reputations. We assume that consumers observe the identity of the …rm or …rms that implement a project.
In our context, this means that …rms can associate their reputations (and qualities) to a project if and only if they participate in the project. 1 An implication of this assumption is that the reputation and quality (or other fundamental characteristics) of a …rm are nonseparable. In the last section of the paper, we discuss the implications of the nonseparability of a …rm's reputation and quality, relating it to the concepts of (non)transferability and (non)tradeability of reputations (see e.g., Tadelis, 1999 Tadelis, , 2002 .
We identify an important di¤erence between projects that are implemented jointly and projects that are implemented by a single …rm. Unlike the case of projects implemented by a single …rm, in the case of joint projects a …rm's reputation may worsen following a success; conversely, a …rm's reputation may improve following a failure. The intuition for these results is the following. Consider a partnership where one of the …rms contributes more to the implementation of the joint project than its partner. When updating their beliefs about …rms'qualities, consumers will tend to attribute the responsibility for a success or a failure of the joint project mainly to that …rm. If partners'qualities are perceived by consumers as being negatively correlated, a success of the joint project may then harm the reputation of the other …rm and a failure may enhance it. In our model this negative correlation is endogenously generated by the …rms'equilibrium implementation strategy of the joint project.
Most of the analysis in the article focuses on projects that cannot be implemented by a single …rm.
This corresponds to situations where …rms have complementary assets or capabilities. In such cases, …rms' choice is between implementing the project through a partnership, or simply not pursuing the project. The dynamics of …rms'reputations associated with joint implementation crucially depends on …rms'equilibrium implementation decisions, as these decisions may signal information about …rms'qualities to the market. We focus on equilibria in which …rms form a partnership and develop the joint project if and only if their qualities are high. 2 In these equilibria, a success of the joint project may a¤ect negatively the reputation of one of the …rms. However, the overall impact of a success of the joint project on …rms'reputations and future pro…ts is positive. Thus, if we de…ne the best partner as the one for which the increase in total pro…ts associated with a partnership is the largest, a high quality partner is preferable to a low quality partner. Regarding the desired reputation of a partner, we identify a basic trade-o¤. While a high reputation partner enhances the reputation of the joint project, such a partner tends to absorb most of the credit associated with a success and to be disregarded as responsible for a failure. As a result, the impact on a …rm's reputation of having a high reputation partner may be negative. If the …rm's future projects are su¢ ciently important relative to the joint project, this negative reputational e¤ect may lead to lower total pro…ts. This implies that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.
In the last part of the article, we relax the assumption that individual implementation of the project is not possible. This allows us to discuss the reputational trade-o¤s involved in the choice between individual and joint implementation. In such cases, a …rm that owns a project faces several implementation options.
First, it may stretch its reputation to the new project, implementing it alone. Second, it may combine its reputation with that of another …rm, implementing the project through a partnership. Third, it may 2 As we shall see, equilibria in which …rms develop the joint project if and only if their qualities are low exist in some cases.
This type of equilibrium does not survive when sabotage of the joint project is possible, i.e., when …rms may make the joint project fail on purpose. In this paper, we focus on sabotage-free equilibria.
fully associate the reputation (and quality) of another …rm to the project, by letting that …rm implement the project alone. This may be accomplished by selling the project to that …rm. 3 We …nd that when a …rm is particularly concerned about its future reputation, the optimal implementation strategy is largely determined by the relative position of its quality and initial reputation. Speci…cally, if the …rm's quality is substantially lower than its initial reputation, the …rm tends to protect its reputation by selling the project to another …rm. On the other hand, if the …rm's quality is substantially higher than its initial reputation, the …rm tends to implement the project alone in order to prove its quality. Finally, if the …rm's quality and initial reputation are close, the …rm is more prone to form a partnership. In such cases, the …rm is neither very reluctant to participate in new projects, nor very eager to implement them alone.
There is an important di¤erence between the case where only joint implementation is possible and the case where individual implementation is also possible. In the former case, …rms'qualities are always substitutes, meaning that the higher the quality of a given …rm the lower the required quality of a partner for a partnership to be formed. In the latter case, …rms'qualities may either be substitutes or complements, where complements means that the higher the quality of a given …rm the higher the required quality of a partner for a partnership to be formed. This di¤erence stems from the fact that, when individual implementation is possible, the higher the quality of a …rm the more attractive individual implementation by that …rm becomes. The fact that …rms'qualities may be complements implies that …rms'incentive to form a partnership may decrease when the quality of one of the …rms increases. Thus, a high quality partner is not necessarily preferable to a low quality partner. This result contrasts with that obtained for the case where individual implementation is not possible. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , uses adverse selection models of reputation, i.e., models where there is incomplete information about …rms' characteristics and reputation corresponds to others' beliefs about those characteristics (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988; Tadelis, 1999; Cabral, 2000) . Ours in an adverse selection model of reputation.
The existing literature on reputation largely focuses on projects developed by a single entity, overlooking the reputational implications of shared responsibility. There are, however, some exceptions. Jeon (1996) analyzes parties' incentives to exert e¤ort in situations of joint production when they are concerned with 3 Since a …rm's reputation and quality are nonseparable, the only way to fully associate another …rm's reputation to the project is by letting that …rm implement the project alone.
their individual reputations, and compares how di¤erent organizational forms perform in solving the parties' moral hazard problem. Bar-Isaac (2007) shows that the concern of a "senior" member about the reputation of a professional partnership (or, more speci…cally, about the reputation of a "junior" member) may induce him/her to exert e¤ort when only the output of the partnership is observed. 4 Anderson and Smith (2006) study matching decisions when parties'reputations are important, and show that positive assortative matching (in reputations) is generally not an equilibrium. An important di¤erence between our paper and Anderson and Smith (2006) , as well as between our paper and Jeon (1996) and Bar-Isaac (2007) , is that we consider a setting where …rms have better information about their qualities than the market. Thus, the contribution of our paper to this literature is to study the dynamics of …rms'reputations when not only the performance of the joint project, but also …rms' decision to implement it reveals information about …rms' qualities to the market. In this setting, …rms' implementation decisions of joint projects depend on the reputational implications (of both the implementation and the performance) of those projects, and, in turn, these reputational implications depend on …rms'implementation decisions. situations where reputations are embedded in names and, as a result, the market for names corresponds to a market for reputations, and analyzes the incentives to buy a name and associate it with a project.
These papers assume that reputation and quality are separable. We focus on situations where reputation and quality are nonseparable and study the intermediate case where a …rm partially associates an existing reputation to a new project by implementing it through a partnership. Furthermore, we analyze a …rm's choice between stretching its reputation, combining its reputation with that of another …rm, and fully associating the reputation (and quality) of another …rm to the project.
Our paper is also related to the literature on multidimensional signalling (and multidimensional screening) 4 Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) also study the incentives of partners to mentor juniors in order to protect the reputation of a professional partnership. The authors focus on the aggregate reputation of the partnership, not on the reputation of its members. In their model, there is no role for individual reputations. This precludes them from analyzing the impact of joint projects on individual reputations, which is our concern here. Tirole (1996) does study the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations when modeling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. However, Tirole focuses on how individual members'incentives (and actions) a¤ect individual and collective reputations, not on how collective actions (for which individual members are jointly responsible) a¤ect those reputations. 5 In formalizing a theory of scapegoats, Segendor¤ (2000) shows that a leader may choose an incompetent co-worker so that he can later protect his reputation in case things go wrong by blaming the co-worker. Segendor¤ also considers that both the leader and the co-worker have private information about their abilities. However, in contrast with our paper, Segendor¤ (2000) focuses on the case where the leader can prove to others that the co-worker is incompetent after a negative joint outcome has been observed.
(e.g., Quinzii and Rochet, 1985; Wilson, 1985; Engers, 1987; Rochet and Chone, 1998) . We assume that side payments between …rms are possible and, as a result, …rms maximize their joint pro…t. Hence, conceptually our problem is similar to that of a monopolist with private information about several characteristics which are unknown to consumers. The main concern in the literature on multidimensional signalling has been the existence and characterization of (fully) separating equilibria. In our model, such equilibria cannot exist because the characteristics about which …rms have private information (…rms'qualities) are continuous and …rms'signal space has two elements -to form a partnership or not to do so.
Plan of the Paper. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3,
we analyze the impact of the performance of joint projects on partners'reputations.
In Section 4, we analyze …rms'incentives to form partnerships and characterize all the reputational implications of those decisions.
In this section, we focus on projects that cannot be implemented individually.
In Section 5, we analyze the case of projects that can be implemented jointly or individually, and study the main reputational trade-o¤s involved in the choice between joint and individual implementation. In Section 6, we present concluding remarks.
Basic Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of …rms with measure one and two periods, period one and period two. At the beginning of period one a countable (i.e., measure zero) subset of the set of possible pairs of …rms are endowed with a joint project, which they may decide to implement or not. Joint projects can only be implemented in period one and last one period if implemented. To capture the dynamic reputational e¤ects of implementing a joint project, we consider that each …rm in the economy is endowed with a basic product that it sells individually in period two. 6 Let …rm A and …rm B be a pair of …rms that is endowed with a joint project. The implementation of the joint project requires the participation of both …rms. 7 The required contribution of …rm A to the partnership is A 2 (0; 1), which implies the complementary contribution B = 1 A of …rm B. Firms'decision is whether or not to form a partnership and implement the joint project in period one. We assume that side payments between …rms are possible. This implies that the division of surplus between …rms is immaterial to the decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project. Firms take the decision that maximizes their joint pro…t.
For concreteness, suppose that the joint project consists of producing and selling a new product. To push reputation to the fore, assume that both this product and …rms'basic products are experience goods.
Thus, consumers base their purchasing decisions on their expectations of the performance of the products. 6 We could assume that …rms also sell their basic products in period one. However, this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis of the basic model without bringing any additional insight. 7 This assumption is relaxed in Section 5, where we assume that either of the two …rms may implement this project alone.
We assume that each of the products either performs well or not. Consumers value the new (joint) product V if it performs well, and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, consumers value …rm i's basic product V i if it performs well, and 0 if otherwise, for all i 2 fA,Bg. Throughout, we say that the joint project is a success if the joint product performs well and a failure if it does not. 8 Technology. Firms are endowed with qualities that a¤ect the performance of their products. More speci…cally, …rm i's quality, q i 2 [0; 1], represents the probability that its products perform well. We assume that the quality of the joint product, i.e., the probability that the joint product performs well, is a weighted average of the …rms'qualities, where the weights are the …rms'participation levels in the joint project. Thus, the quality of the joint product given …rms'qualities q (q A ; q B ), which we denote by q J (q), is given by
Information. The following is common knowledge. Firms know their qualities. Speci…cally, each …rm knows its own quality and the quality of the potential partner. Consumers do not know …rms' qualities.
They hold beliefs about these qualities. Consumers' initial beliefs about …rm i's quality, i.e., consumers'
beliefs about q i at the beginning of period one, are described by the (correct) prior G i (q i ) (with density
, for all i 2 fA,Bg. Consumers may have di¤erent priors about …rms A and B, as the two …rms may di¤er in dimensions (not explicitly modelled here) that are observable by consumers. 10 We assume that these priors are atomless distributions, that g i (q i ) > 0 for all q i 2 [0; 1] and i 2 fA,Bg, and that consumers initially perceive …rms' qualities as independent. The prior joint distribution of …rms' qualities is denoted by G(q) (with density g(q)).
Consumers do not observe whether …rms are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period one. However, they do observe …rms'decision to form a partnership and implement a joint project. Thus, consumers only learn about the existence of a joint project in case it is implemented. At the end of period one, consumers observe the performance of the joint project in case …rms implemented it. We denote the performance of the joint product by ' 2 ff; sg, where ' = s if the joint project is a success, and ' = f if it is a failure. Joint product performance is public information. Although consumers know the identity of each partner and its required contribution to the partnership, they do not observe which …rm is responsible for a success or a failure of the joint project. 8 In this model, a …rm's production of a given product can be interpreted either as the situation where the …rm produces one unit of the product or many units that perform equally. 9 Alternatively, we could assume a more general function q J (q). As long as this function is increasing in q A and q B , the characterization of the equilibria would not change. It should be noted, however, that to ensure the existence of some of the equilibria analyzed in the paper, continuity of q J (q) in q is required. 1 0 Suppose, for example, that …rms in the economy are distributed in a two-dimensional space (q; ), where is observable by consumers. Then, G i (q i ) corresponds to consumers' (correct) prior about …rm i's quality given i , for i 2 fA;Bg. The observable parameter may correspond, for instance, to the size of the …rm, to the industry where it operates, or to whether it is listed in the stock exchange or not.
Consumers update their beliefs about …rms' qualities both after observing the implementation of the joint project and after observing its performance. Since consumers do not observe whether …rms have a joint project available and the set of …rms that have one is of measure zero, consumers' posterior beliefs are equal to their prior beliefs if …rms do not implement the joint project. This is consistent with the fact that, in practice, consumers typically do not revise their perception about a …rm's quality if they observe that no (unexpected) partnership has been formed. 11 We denote consumers'beliefs after they observe the formation of a partnership and the implementation of the joint project by H 1 (q) (with density h 1 (q)) and call them interim beliefs. Similarly, we denote consumers' beliefs following the observation of the performance of the joint project by H 2 (q j' ) (with density h 2 (q j' )) and call them ex-post beliefs. Consumers observe the performance of the joint project at the end of period one, before they purchase …rms'basic products in period two.
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Reputation. We de…ne a …rm's reputation as the expected value, from the consumers' perspective, of the …rm's quality given the information that consumers possess. In our context, a …rm's reputation can be interpreted as the expected probability that the …rm's products perform well.
There are three types of reputations that are relevant for decision making. First, the initial reputations, which correspond to …rms' reputations at the beginning of period one. The initial reputation of …rm i 2 fA;Bg, denoted by r i , is the expected value of its quality according to consumers'initial beliefs G(q). Second, the interim reputations, which correspond to …rms' reputations after consumers observe …rms' decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project. The interim reputation of …rm i 2 fA;Bg, denoted by r 0 i , is the expected value of its quality according to consumers'interim beliefs H 1 (q). Third, the ex-post reputations, which correspond to …rms'reputations at the beginning of period two, after consumers observe the formation of a partnership and the performance of the joint project. The ex-post reputation of …rm i 2 fA;Bg, denoted by r 00 i ('), is the expected value of its quality according to consumers' ex-post beliefs H 2 (q j' ).
Expected Pro…ts. For simplicity, we assume that …rms' production costs of the joint product and of their period two products are zero. Furthermore, we assume that the market is short on the sellers'side and that consumers bid competitively for all the products. Thus, …rms'pro…ts associated with a given product 1 1 Consider, for example, the recent partnership between Harley Davidson and Porsche to produce the V-Rod motorcycle.
Suppose that, after considering the implementation of the project, the two companies had instead decided not to pursue it.
If consumers were unaware that Harley Davidson and Porsche were considering such a project, it is unlikely that they would update their beliefs about …rms'qualities following …rms'decision not to implement it. 1 2 The results in the paper hold if the measure of …rms that have a joint project available to be implemented in period one is positive but small. This is because the interim and ex-post beliefs are continuous in the probability that …rms have a joint project available when that probability is zero. The results about existence and characterization of equilibria in Propositions 1 to 3 of Section 4 remain valid even if the measure of …rms that have a joint project available is higher.
correspond to the consumers'willingness to pay for that product. 13 Consumers'willingness to pay for a product is given by their expected bene…t from consumption. Hence, consumers'valuation of the joint product when …rms implement it is the expected value of ( A e q A + B e q B )V according to consumers'interim beliefs. 14 By de…nition of reputation, this is equal to
In a similar way, consumers' valuation of the basic product of …rm i 2 fA,Bg sold in period two is the expected value of e q i V i according to ex-post beliefs if …rms implement the joint project and to initial beliefs if …rms do not implement the joint project. Thus, in case of implementation and performance ' of the joint project, this valuation is
In case of no implementation of the joint project this valuation is r i V i .
When considering the decision to form a partnership, …rms compare their expected joint pro…t with and without implementation of the joint project. Since, in general, these pro…ts depend on …rms'qualities, we denote them by P (q) and 0 (q), respectively. From (2.2) and (2.3) it follows that
The …rst term in (2.4) corresponds to the direct pro…ts from implementing the joint project. The second and third terms in (2.4) correspond to …rms' expected pro…ts associated with selling their basic products in period two. Firms' period two pro…ts depend on their ex-post reputations, which are the reputations associated with a success of the joint project with probability q J (q) and the reputations associated with a failure with the complementary probability. Note that the qualities of …rms A and B do not a¤ect the pro…t associated with the joint project; they a¤ect pro…ts only by a¤ecting the performance of the joint project and, thereby, …rms'future reputations.
By deciding not to implement the joint project, …rms forego the potential pro…t associated with it, but insulate their reputations from the performance of the joint project. 15 Firms' joint pro…t associated with not implementing the joint project is given by
Equilibrium. We characterize …rms'equilibrium decision of whether to form a partnership and implement the joint project for …xed initial beliefs. We denote …rms' strategy by (q), which represents the 1 3 As, for example, in Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000) , this assumption allows us to ignore signalling through prices. This allows us to focus on the decision to form a partnership. 1 4 Throughout the paper we use tilde signs to denote random variables. 1 5 This closely parallels Cabral (2000) , where the reputation of an existing brand remains unchanged if the …rm decides not to stretch the brand to a new project.
probability that they form a partnership given their qualities. We assume that …rms form a partnership if and only if P (q) > 0 (q). Thus, as a tie-breaking rule we assume that …rms do not form a partnership if
We use Bayesian Equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. In equilibrium, …rms' decision of whether to form a partnership and implement the joint project maximizes their joint pro…t given their future reputations, and …rms'future reputations are Bayesian consistent with …rms'strategy regarding the decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project.
Joint Project Performance and Reputation
In this section, we characterize the impact of the performance of the joint project on …rms' reputations, taking …rms'decision to implement it and consumers'interim beliefs as given. This is only a …rst step in our analysis. In Section 4, we then consider all the reputational implications of implementing the joint project by endogenizing …rms'implementation decision and, therefore, consumers'interim beliefs.
Suppose that at the beginning of period one …rms A and B formed a partnership and implemented the joint project. Following the observation of the performance of the project at the end of the period, consumers update their beliefs about …rms'qualities. They do so by applying Bayes'rule to interim beliefs H 1 (q). Thus, consumers'ex-post beliefs satisfy
for all ' 2 ff; sg, where Pr[' = s j q] = q J (q) and Pr[' = f j q] = 1 q J (q) represent, respectively, the probability that the joint project succeeds and the probability that it fails. Using (3.1) one can characterize the impact of the performance of the joint project on …rms'reputations. Lemma 1 o¤ers a useful characterization of …rms'ex-post reputations, relating them to the interim reputations.
Lemma 1
The ex-post reputations of …rm i 2 fA;Bg in case of a success (' = s) and of a failure (' = f ) of the joint project are such that
where r
, and var(e q i ) and cov(e q A ; e q B ) are, respectively, the variance of e q i and the covariance between e q A and e q B according to interim beliefs H 1 (q).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 characterizes the updating that takes place on …rms'reputations when consumers observe the performance of a joint project. In particular, it emphasizes that the change in a …rm's reputation depends on consumers' perceived variance of its quality, as well as on consumers' perceived correlation between its quality and the quality of the partner (captured in (3.2)-(3.4) by the covariance term). Note that even if consumers initially perceive …rms' qualities as not correlated, this is not necessarily the case after they observe that a partnership has been formed.
When consumers'interim beliefs are such that the correlation between …rms'perceived qualities is nonnegative, (3.2) and (3.3) reveal that …rms'reputations necessarily increase with a success of a joint project and decrease with a failure. 16 Observe, however, that if consumers' interim beliefs are such that …rms' qualities are negatively correlated, the numerator in (3.2)-(3.4) may eventually be negative. This raises the possibility that a …rm's reputation decreases with a success of a joint project and increases with a failure.
One important question is whether such an updating may occur in equilibrium when …rms'decisions to form partnerships are taken into account. We next analyze this issue among others.
Partnership Formation and Reputation Dynamics
In this section, we analyze …rms' decision to form a partnership and the evolution of …rms' reputations following this decision. We take into account both the signalling e¤ect of the decision to form a partnership and the e¤ect of the performance of the joint project on …rms'reputations.
In equilibrium, consumers' beliefs about …rms' qualities must be consistent with …rms' strategy (q).
Thus, in equilibrium, consumers'interim beliefs result from applying Bayes rule to initial beliefs G(q). That is, consumer's interim beliefs must satisfy
Clearly, these beliefs may di¤er from consumers'initial beliefs. Intuitively, this is because …rms'decision to form a partnership may signal information about their qualities to consumers. By a¤ecting interim beliefs, 1 6 This is the case, for example, when consumers'interim beliefs H 1 (q) are such that …rms'qualities are independent. In this case, cov(e q A ; e q B ) in Lemma 1 is 0, which implies that r 00 i (s) > r 0 i , r 00 i (f ) < r 0 i and, consequently, r 00 i (s) > r 00 i (f ) for all i 2 fA;Bg. Note that the case where consumers' interim beliefs H 1 (q) are such that …rms' qualities are independent comprises the case where consumers are uncertain about the quality of only one …rm. Thus, if consumers are uncertain about the quality of only one …rm, a success (resp. failure) of the joint project always has a positive (resp. negative) impact on the reputation of that …rm. This is what happens when a …rm implements a project alone. This is also what happens, for example, in Bar-Isaac (2007). In Bar-Isaac (2007) only the ability of the junior member in the partnership is uncertain. Thus, the junior member's reputation always increases following a good performance of the partnership. this signalling e¤ect also a¤ects ex-post beliefs. Indeed, from (4.1) and (3.1) it follows that consumers' ex-post beliefs must satisfy
From (4.1) and (4.2) it is immediate that …rms'interim and ex-post reputations critically depend on …rms' equilibrium strategy (q). Thus, one cannot study the reputational implications of joint projects without analyzing …rms'equilibrium decisions regarding the implementation of such projects.
Equipped with the above characterization of consumers'interim and ex-post beliefs, we now investigate how …rms' qualities a¤ect their decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project. When deciding whether to form a partnership and implement the joint project, …rms consider two main e¤ects.
While the implementation of the joint project allows …rms to capture the pro…ts associated with this project, it also a¤ects …rms future reputations and thereby their future pro…ts. The …rst e¤ect is always non-negative.
The second e¤ect may be negative or positive.
As it is typically the case in signalling games, there always exists a pooling equilibrium in which …rms A and B abstain from implementing the joint project regardless of their qualities, i.e., in which (q) = 0
This equilibrium exists because the notion of Bayesian equilibrium does not impose any restriction on beliefs associated with zero-probability events. In our case, if we make consumers' beliefs su¢ ciently unfavorable to …rms in the event they implement the joint project, we can support a pooling equilibrium in which …rms never implement it. In this equilibrium, …rms'reputations remain unchanged but would be very low in the event they decided to implement the joint project. A well-known problem of this type of equilibrium is that it crucially relies on the arbitrary assumption of "su¢ ciently unfavorable"beliefs o¤-the-equilibrium path. Because of this arbitrariness and the fact that in our model consumers' beliefs determine …rms' reputations, which are the major driver of …rms' decisions, we ignore this equilibrium in the remainder of the paper. In fact, this equilibrium is not a universally divine equilibrium. 17 We now focus on equilibria with implementation of the joint project, i.e., equilibria in which at least some (types of) …rms A and B form a partnership and implement the joint project. If the value of the joint project V is su¢ ciently high relative to the values of …rms'future projects V A and V B (and of course …rms' interim reputations are bounded away from 0), …rms will have the incentive to form a partnership regardless of their qualities. This is because …rms'direct pro…t associated with the joint project will always o¤set …rms' eventual losses in future projects due to reputational implications of the joint project. To make this claim more precise, let V denote the value of V that satis…es the following condition,
where var(e q i ) corresponds to the variance of e q i according to consumers'initial beliefs G(q). Then, we can state the following. We devote the remainder of this section to the analysis of joint projects with value V V . For V V , …rms'direct pro…t associated with the joint project is no longer su¢ cient to always compensate …rms'eventual losses in future projects due to reputational implications of the joint project. Consequently, no equilibrium where …rms form a partnership and implement the joint project regardless of their qualities exists. In such cases, the only equilibria with implementation of the joint project are semiseparating equilibria, i.e., equilibria where some but not all (types of) …rms A and B form a partnership. As we will see below, these equilibria emerge because …rms with a di¤erent combined quality A q A + B q B may have a di¤erent incentive to form a partnership.
Proposition 2 For V V , (i) a semiseparating equilibrium where …rms implement the joint project i¤ their combined quality is above a threshold quality level (higher quality partners equilibrium) always exists, and (ii) under some conditions, a semiseparating equilibrium where …rms implement the joint project i¤ their combined quality is below a threshold quality level (lower quality partners equilibrium) exists.
Proposition 2 identi…es two types of equilibria: higher quality partners equilibria and lower quality partners equilibria. Higher quality partners equilibria correspond to situations where the impact of the performance of the joint project on …rms' reputations is such that a success leads to a higher future joint pro…t than does a failure. In this case, …rms implement the project whenever they can guarantee a success with a su¢ ciently high probability. Since the probability of success increases with …rms'qualities, for a given quality of one of the …rms, …rms implement the joint product when the quality of the other …rm is su¢ ciently high. Technically, this equilibrium emerges because …rms'expected joint pro…t from implementing the joint project satis…es the single-crossing property with respect to qualities. In our context, this means that …rms' incremental gain from implementing the joint project increases with …rms' qualities. An immediate implication is that low quality …rms do not have the incentive to imitate high quality …rms and implement the joint project.
Bayesian updating by consumers implies only that the reputation of one of the …rms in the partnership increases with a success of the joint project and decreases with a failure. In fact, it may happen that the reputation of the other …rm decreases with a success of the joint project and increases with a failure.
The idea that a …rm's reputation may decrease following a success of a project in which it participates and increase following a failure may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. One typically expects that being associated with a successful event is better in terms of reputation than being associated with an event that is perceived as a failure. To understand these results let us go back to our model. For concreteness, consider the case of …rm A and assume that its participation level in the partnership is low. In case of a success of the joint project, consumers infer that …rm B (the one whose contribution to the project is high) has a high quality. Moreover, following implementation of the joint project, consumers perceive …rms'qualities as negatively correlated, as implementation occurs more often when …rms' qualities are signi…cantly di¤erent (i.e., one is high and the other low) than when they are similar. This negative correlation is endogenously generated by the implementation strategy itself, since by assumption …rms'qualities are initially perceived as independent. 18 If this negative correlation is su¢ ciently high (in absolute value), consumers infer that …rm A has a low quality. In case of a failure of the joint project, a similar reasoning would lead to the opposite conclusion.
19 1 8 In Miklós-Thal (2008) in equilibrium brand stretching introduces endogenous positive correlation between the quality of the new product and the quality of the initial product, even if qualities were initially perceived as independent. In contrast, in our model the endogenous quality correlation generated in equilibrium by the decision to form a partnership is negative. 1 9 The reputational consequences for Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) of the release in 2002 of the movie "John Q"
illustrate that, in fact, when there is shared responsibility the reputational dynamics may be rather intricate. The release of the
In a higher quality partners equilibrium, a success of the joint project may have a negative e¤ect on the reputation of one of the …rms. However, if this negative e¤ect is present it is always dominated by the positive e¤ect of a success on the other …rm's reputation. Hence, a higher combined quality implies a higher expected joint pro…t. We next present an example of a higher quality partners equilibrium where the reputation of one of the …rms (…rm A) decreases following a success of the joint project and increases following a failure. Because of its extreme simplicity, we provide here an example with two-type …rms.
Example 1 Suppose that q i 2 f0; 1g and that consumers initially believe that q i = 1 with probability p i , for all i 2 fA; Bg. In this two-type case, a …rm's reputation is the consumers' perceived probability that the …rm is of quality 1. Thus, p i is the initial reputation of …rm i. Consider now an implementation strategy where …rms implement the joint project i¤ q 2 f(1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g, i.e., they abstain from implementing the joint project only if both have quality 0. Given this strategy, Bayesian updating implies that …rm i's interim reputation satis…es r
, for all i 2 fA; Bg. In a similar way, Bayesian updating implies that …rm i's ex-post reputations satisfy
where j 2 fA; Bg with j 6 = i, for all i 2 fA; Bg. Lower quality partners equilibria correspond to situations where a success of the joint project has a negative impact on …rms'joint pro…t. This is the case because the negative e¤ect of a success of the joint project on the reputation of one of the …rms exists and dominates the positive e¤ect of a success on the other …rm's reputation. Since …rms have a higher joint pro…t when the joint project fails than when it succeeds, movie seemed to entail signi…cant reputational risks for HMOs. The movie depicted a desperate man wielding a gun who took over a hospital when his health plan did not cover his son's heart transplant operation. Instead of criticizing …lmmakers for the inaccuracies and unfairness of the movie, the American Association of Health Plans reacted by emphasizing the government's responsibility for not helping uninsured and underinsured customers in an advertisement stating "John Q. It's not just a movie. It's a crisis for 40 million people who can't a¤ord health care." As a result, the responsibility for the "crisis" was largely attributed to the government and HMOs' reputation apparently did not su¤er. As Mark Goodin, a consultant to the Association put it: "...we got a lot of media coverage, and more important, we didn't come across as inhumane by trying to defend the indefensible" (Alsop, 2004, p. 26) .
…rms with high qualities are more reluctant to implement the joint project than …rms with low qualities. As in higher quality partners equilibria, here …rms' expected joint pro…t from implementing the joint project satis…es the single-crossing property with respect to qualities. In this case, however, …rms'incremental gain from implementing the joint project decreases with …rms'qualities. Lower quality partners equilibria may provide an explanation for the fact that …rms may implement joint projects of moderate value even when their qualities are low and there is a good chance that the project fails. 20 We identi…ed all possible types of equilibria. In our setting, there are only two possible types of semiseparating equilibria, higher quality partners equilibria and lower quality partners equilibria, depending on whether a success of the joint project has a positive or negative impact on …rms'future pro…ts. It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that a higher quality partners equilibrium always exists when an equilibrium in which …rms implement the joint project regardless of their qualities does not. Proposition 2 also states that there are situations where a lower quality partners equilibrium exists. Note, however, that a lower quality partners equilibrium in which the reputation of …rm i 2 fA;Bg decreases following a success of the joint project can exist only if i < V i =(V A + V B ). Furthermore, a lower quality partners equilibrium can exist only if the value of the joint project V is strictly positive. Indeed, when V is zero only higher quality partners equilibria exist among those equilibria with implementation of the joint project. 21 In a lower quality partners equilibrium, …rms are better o¤ if the joint project fails than if it succeeds.
Since partners typically have the possibility to in ‡uence the performance of a joint project, the fact that …rms are better o¤ if the joint project fails than if it succeeds suggests the possibility of sabotage, i.e., the possibility that partners may make the joint project fail on purpose. 22 When sabotage is possible, lower quality partners equilibria do not exist. To see why this is the case consider the following. Suppose that a lower quality partners equilibrium exists and sabotage is possible. In such an equilibrium, all …rms that implement the joint project will sabotage it. Thus, a failure of the joint project is no longer informative about …rms'qualities and …rms'joint pro…t under implementation of the joint project is independent of their qualities. It follows that either all pairs of …rms or no pair of …rms implement the joint project. This leads to a contradiction, since by de…nition in a lower quality partners equilibrium no full pooling exists.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on higher quality partners equilibria. When V < V , higher quality partners equilibria are the only equilibria with implementation of the joint project that are sabotagefree; they are also the only universally divine equilibria that are sabotage-free. In the equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 1, low quality …rms also implement the joint project. However, such an equilibrium exists only if the value of the joint project is high enough to o¤set the negative reputational e¤ect associated with its failure. 2 1 For a formal proof of these results see Appendix A.2. 2 2 Although sabotage is unlikely to occur in some situations because of ethical or legal reasons (e.g., medical doctors performing a surgery together), in most cases it is certainly a real possibility. 2 3 In general, we cannot rule out the possibility that there exists more than one higher quality partners equilibrium. However,
In a higher quality partners equilibrium, …rms'qualities are substitutes, in the sense that the marginal rate at which …rms'qualities can be exchanged so that their incentives to form a partnership remain constant is negative. This is because …rms want to ensure a success of the joint project with a certain probability.
Thus, the higher the quality of a given …rm, the lower the minimum required quality of the partner. More speci…cally, the rate at which …rms' qualities can be substituted so that the joint project is implemented depends on the required contributions of …rms A and B to the partnership. This rate, which is given by A = B (or equivalently by A =(1 A )), is increasing (in absolute value) in …rm A's contribution A . This implies that the higher A , the higher the increment in …rm B's quality required to compensate for a given reduction in …rm A's quality for the project to be implemented.
We now characterize how a partnership a¤ects the evolution of …rms' reputations in a higher quality partners equilibrium. Although the impact of a success or a failure of the joint project on …rms'reputations has already been discussed, for completeness we include this result in Proposition 3. In Proposition 3, we also characterize the impact of the decision to form a partnership on …rms'reputations, and the combined impact of the decision to form a partnership and of the performance of the joint project on …rms'reputations. contributions to the partnership are identical (i.e., A = B = 1=2). 2 4 The only possible case of a higher quality partners equilibrium in which …rms'reputations do not strictly increase following the decision to form a partnership is that where only …rms with qualities q A = q B = 0 do not form a partnership.
the signalling e¤ect associated with the decision to form a partnership and of the e¤ect of the performance of the joint project on consumers' beliefs. The Proposition states that when the e¤ect of a success of the joint project on a …rm's reputation is negative, this e¤ect is dominated by the positive signalling e¤ect.
We now study how …rms' initial reputations a¤ect the impact of a partnership on …rms' joint pro…t and, therefore, the decision to form a partnership. By a¤ecting the reputation with which the joint project is launched, a …rm's reputation has an obvious positive impact on …rms' joint pro…t under a partnership.
However, a …rm's reputation may also have a negative impact on its partner's reputation and, thereby, on joint pro…t. This is so because the higher the …rm's reputation, the more consumers will tend to give this …rm the credit in case of a success of the joint project and to disregard its responsibility in case of a failure. Proposition 4 captures this e¤ect by showing that a …rm may be more demanding in terms of a partner's quality when the partner's reputation is high than when it is low. For convenience, we focus on the higher quality partners equilibrium in which the set of …rms'qualities for which a partnership is formed is the greatest. 25 In our setting, this corresponds to the higher quality partners equilibrium with the lowest combined quality threshold above which …rms form a partnership.
Proposition 4 A higher reputation of one of the …rms may increase the lowest combined quality threshold level above which …rms implement the joint project in a higher quality partners equilibrium. given and analyze how the quality and reputation of the potential partners a¤ect the dynamics of reputation formation and, thereby, …rms' incentives to form a partnership. We de…ne a partnership broadly as any situation where two or more parties contribute to the performance of a given project. Thus, our results apply, for example, not only to partner selection in joint-ventures, but also to the selection of trading partners such as retailers or suppliers. In our setting, the best partner is the one for which the increase in total pro…ts associated with a partnership is the largest. In a higher quality partners equilibrium, a higher quality partner is always preferable to a lower quality partner. This is because a success of the joint project leads to a higher future joint pro…t than a failure and the probability of success increases with …rms' qualities.
However, a higher reputation partner is not always preferable to a lower reputation partner, because the impact on a …rm's reputation of having a higher reputation partner may be negative.
Individual vs. Joint Implementation
In this section, we assume that the joint project may be implemented not only jointly but also by either of the two …rms alone. 26 This allows us to analyze the main reputational trade-o¤s associated with the choice between joint and individual implementation of a project.
When individual implementation is possible, the best alternative to a partnership may be implementation by a single …rm. If this is the case, an increase in the quality of that …rm a¤ects not only …rms'joint pro…t under a partnership, but also under the best alternative to a partnership. As shown below, this introduces two main di¤erences relative to the results presented in Section 4. First, in a higher quality partners equilibrium, where a success of the joint project leads to a higher joint pro…t than a failure, an increase in …rms'combined quality may decrease …rms'incentive to form a partnership. Second, …rms'qualities may be complements, meaning that at the margin a higher quality …rm may require a higher quality partner to form a partnership.
In general, a …rm that has the opportunity to develop a new project faces di¤erent implementation options. First, the …rm may stretch its reputation to the new project, by implementing it alone. This may be accomplished by marketing the product resulting from the project under the …rm's existing brand, a practice that has been designated as "brand stretching" or "umbrella branding" (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988; Cabral, 2000) . In addition, the …rm may combine its reputation with that of another …rm, by implementing the project through a partnership. Finally, the …rm may associate the reputation (and quality) of another …rm to the project, by selling the project to that …rm, who would implement it alone. In our setting, a …rm's reputation and quality are nonseparable. Hence, the only way to fully associate the reputation of another …rm to the new project is by letting that …rm implement the project alone.
The decision of how to implement the joint project involves a basic trade-o¤. Through individual implementation, …rms associate the reputation of one of them to the project. However, doing so may create too much "exposure"for that …rm, as it is fully responsible for the performance of the project. Thus, even if the reputation of, let us say, …rm A is high and can therefore be used to boost consumers' perceptions of the project, individual implementation by …rm B and joint implementation have the advantage of allowing …rm A to insulate its reputation fully or partially from the performance of the project. 27 2 6 In spite of the fact that in this section the period one project may be implemented by either of the two …rms alone, for convenience we continue to call it the joint project. 2 7 The paper by Lang (2003) on team formation studies a related problem. Speci…cally, Lang analyzes the incentives of two Throughout this section, we continue to assume that only a subset of measure zero of the set of possible pairs of …rms are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period one. We also assume that a subset of positive measure of those …rms that are not endowed with a joint project are endowed with an individual project that they always implement. Thus, while consumers do not expect …rms to form partnerships and implement joint projects in period one, they do expect …rms to implement individual projects. Moreover, since …rms always implement their individual projects, a …rm's reputation does not change following the decision to implement an individual project. 28 Finally, we assume that consumers are unable to distinguish a …rm's individual project from a joint project that is implemented individually by the …rm. This assumption, together with the fact that …rms are expected to implement individual projects (but not joint projects) with positive probability imply that after observing a …rm implementing a project alone consumers always infer that it is an individual project of that …rm. This means that, from a reputational point of view, consumers treat joint projects implemented by a single …rm as individual projects of that …rm, and so do we in this section.
Since we are interested in analyzing …rms' decisions to form partnerships, we consider the case of two …rms that are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period one. We denote them by …rm A and …rm B. For simplicity, we consider throughout this section the case where only …rm A is endowed with a basic product in period two. Thus, the performance of the joint project is relevant only to the extent that it may a¤ect …rm A's ex-post reputation. As before, we assume that if …rms A and B form a partnership to implement the joint project, they do so with exogenous participation levels A and B .
Firms'implementation decision is denoted by 2 fA; B; P g, where = A if …rm A implements the project alone, = B if …rm B implements the project alone, and = P if …rms form a partnership.
We now study how …rms'qualities a¤ect the implementation decision of the joint project. We start by characterizing the best alternative to a partnership. In our setting, if …rm B implements the joint project alone, it associates its reputation to the joint project and …rm A associates its reputation -which remains unchanged -to its period two product. Thus, …rms'joint pro…t is r B V + r A V A . This is greater than the joint pro…t in the situation where the joint project is not implemented, which is r A V A . Thus, the best alternative agents, who are concerned with their reputations, to pool their productions by forming a team, when they could continue to produce separately. As in our case, the decision to work jointly (rather than remain separate) allows agents to mitigate the impact of their own performance on their reputation. While in Lang (2003) forming a partnership is a signal of quality because teaming costs decrease with qualities, we consider that partnership formation is cost neutral. In our case, forming a partnership is a signal of quality because quality a¤ects performance, which in turn a¤ects future reputations. 2 8 The assumption that …rms always implement individual projects simpli…es the analysis, but is not crucial to obtain the results presented in this section. The results would be qualitatively the same if we assumed instead that only higher quality …rms implement their individual projects in period one if they are endowed with one. This would imply an increase in reputation following the implementation of an individual project and a decrease in reputation in case the …rm did not implement any project in period one.
to a partnership is either implementation by …rm A alone or implementation by …rm B alone.
Lemma 2 The best alternative to a partnership is implementation by …rm A alone if
where var(e q A ) is the variance of e q A according to the prior G A ( ). Otherwise, the best alternative to a partnership is implementation by …rm B alone.
Condition ( We now study …rms'choice between individual implementation of the joint project (…rm A or …rm B) and joint implementation through a partnership. An implementation strategy of the joint project by …rms A and B is a mapping (q; ) that for each quality vector q assigns …rms'probability of choosing implementation form 2 fA; B; P g.
As in the case where only joint implementation of the project is possible (Section 4), here there also exists an equilibrium in which …rms never form a partnership. Again, this equilibrium exists because the notion of Bayesian equilibrium does not impose any restriction on beliefs associated with zero-probability events.
Thus, making consumers'beliefs su¢ ciently unfavorable to …rms in the event they form a partnership, we can support an equilibrium in which …rms never implement the joint project jointly. We now analyze semiseparating equilibria. Again, we focus on higher quality partners equilibria, where …rms are better o¤ if a joint project that is implemented through a partnership succeeds than if it fails. As in Section 4, lower quality partners equilibria, where …rms are better o¤ if a joint project that is implemented through a partnership fails than if it succeeds, do not exist if sabotage is possible.
In contrast with Section 4, here the characterization of equilibria depends on whether the best alternative to a partnership is individual implementation by …rm A (i.e., q A > q A ) or by …rm B (i.e., q A < q A ).
Proposition 6
Suppose that the joint project can be implemented either through a partnership or individually and consider any higher quality partners equilibrium. For q A < q A , …rms form a partnership if and only if their combined quality A q A + B q B is above a threshold quality level. For q A > q A , such threshold quality levels no longer exist, since …rms' incentive to form a partnership may decrease as …rms' combined quality increases.
For q A < q A , the characterization of higher quality partners equilibria is similar to that in the case where individual implementation is not possible: …rms form a partnership whenever their combined quality is su¢ ciently high. For q A > q A , …rms'decision to form a partnership is no longer characterized by such a cuto¤ rule in terms of …rms'combined qualities.
The intuition is the following. In a higher quality partners equilibrium, the joint pro…t under a partnership is increasing in …rms' combined quality. For q A < q A , the best alternative to a partnership is individual implementation by …rm B. As in the case where individual implementation is not possible, the joint pro…t under the best alternative to a partnership is independent of …rms' qualities. Thus, the higher the …rms' combined qualities the higher their incentives to form a partnership. For q A > q A , the joint pro…t under the best alternative to a partnership (individual implementation by …rm A) is increasing in …rm A's quality. This implies that an increase in …rms'combined quality -which may involve, for example, a signi…cant increase in q A and a decrease in q B -no longer implies that …rms'incentive to form a partnership increases. Indeed it may decrease.
Proposition 6 implies that, for q A < q A , qualities are always substitutes, in the sense that the marginal rate at which …rms'qualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form a partnership remains constant is negative. More speci…cally, this rate is A = B , which is the rate at which qualities q A and q B can be exchanged to keep …rms'combined quality constant. In contrast, for q A > q A , qualities may be complements, in the sense that the marginal rate at which …rms'qualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form a partnership remains constant is positive. When q A > q A , an increase in …rm A's quality increases the joint pro…t under the best alternative to a partnership, individual implementation by …rm A. Thus, the marginal rate at which …rms'qualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form a partnership remains constant is greater when q A > q A than when q A < q A . It may even happen that when …rm A's quality increases, …rm B's quality also has to increase for …rms'incentive to form a partnership to remain constant. In Example 2, we present a higher quality partners equilibrium where this is the case.
The fact that in a higher quality partners equilibrium qualities may be complements implies that …rms' incentive to form a partnership may decrease when the quality of one of the …rms increases. Thus, when both individual and joint implementation of the joint project are possible, a higher quality partner is not necessarily preferable to a lower quality partner. 29 This contrasts with the results obtained in Section 4
for the case where individual implementation is not possible. In that case, qualities are always substitutes and in a higher quality partners equilibrium a higher quality partner is always preferable to a lower quality partner.
Example 2 Suppose that …rms'qualities, as initially perceived by consumers, are uniformly distributed, i.e., In this example, since the value of the joint project is zero, the implementation decision of the joint project is important only because it a¤ects …rm A's future reputation. In the example, qualities are complements when …rm A's quality is high. The intuition is the following. When …rm A has a high quality, the best alternative to a partnership is individual implementation by …rm A. In addition, the higher the quality of …rm A, the more attractive this alternative becomes relative to a partnership. Since in this equilibrium …rms'pro…t from a partnership increases with …rm B's quality, the higher the quality of …rm A the higher the required quality of …rm B for a partnership to be formed.
In Figure 1 , we can identify three regions in the space of …rms'qualities. Each region corresponds to a di¤erent implementation decision of the joint project. In Region 1, …rm B implements the joint project alone.
In this region, since …rm A's quality is relatively low and this …rm is the major contributor to the partnership ( A = 0:95), the probability of success of the joint project is low both when …rm A implements the project alone and under the partnership. Thus, any of these implementation decisions would jeopardize …rm A's future reputation. Implementation by …rm B alone insulates …rm A's future reputation from the performance of the joint project. In Region 2, forming a partnership is optimal. In this region, …rms'combined qualities are su¢ ciently high to generate a probability of success of the joint project, when implemented through a partnership, that ensures an increase in …rm A's future reputation relative to its initial reputation. As a result, the partnership dominates individual implementation by …rm B. In addition, in this region …rm B's quality is su¢ ciently high (and/or …rm A's quality is su¢ ciently low) for individual implementation by …rm A to be dominated by the partnership. Finally, in Region 3 …rm A's quality is so high that implementation by …rm A alone dominates implementation by …rm B alone. Furthermore, since the quality of …rm B is relatively low, forming a partnership is also dominated by individual implementation by …rm A.
Let us assume that …rm A, the …rm whose future reputation matters, is the one that initially faces the opportunity to develop the joint project. In this case, we can interpret the regions discussed above in terms of the choice among stretching an existing reputation, fully associating the reputation of another …rm to the project, and combining reputations through a partnership, when implementing a new project. Speci…cally, in Region 1 …rm A fully associates the reputation of …rm B to the project by selling the project to that …rm;
in Region 2 …rm A combines its reputation with that of …rm B through a partnership; and in Region 3 …rm A stretches its reputation by implementing the project alone.
Example 2 illustrates important aspects of the management of reputations when …rms face the opportunity to develop a new project. Let us again take the perspective of …rm A. When …rm A's quality is considerably lower than its initial reputation, …rm A optimally avoids participating in projects with low value-creation potential per se, unless its partner has a very high quality. This allows …rm A to conceal its true quality and to protect its reputation for future use in projects where a good reputation allows it to create high value. In contrast, when …rm A's initial reputation is considerably lower than its quality, …rm A has the incentive to participate in projects (even of low value) in order to improve its reputation. Finally, when …rm A's quality and initial reputation are close, …rm A is more prone to form a partnership, as it is neither very reluctant to participate in projects to hide its true quality nor very eager to implement them alone in order to improve a reputation that is much lower than its true quality.
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This discussion emphasizes that a …rm's decision to stretch an existing reputation, to combine this reputation with that of another …rm, or to fully associate the reputation of another …rm to a project crucially depends on the relative position of the …rm's own quality and reputation. A higher reputation relative to true quality induces …rms to be more conservative and selective in terms of project implementation. A lower reputation relative to true quality induces …rms to be more entrepreneurial and implement more projects, in order to raise their public image.
Conclusion
An important feature of many markets is the existence of information asymmetries about relevant characteristics of …rms. In such cases, reputations are critical intangible assets. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of products and tasks that have to be performed requires an increasing level of specialization, which, in turn, induces …rms to increasingly participate in joint projects. In this paper, we study the reputational implications of joint projects and …rms'incentives to participate in such projects when reputational considerations are important.
Although we frame our analysis in terms of interaction among …rms, most of the insights generated in this paper also apply to situations where individuals, countries or other organizations engage in joint projects.
The extent to which our results directly apply to these settings may depend, however, on the assumption of payo¤ transferability between partners. When payo¤s are not transferable, it may be more di¢ cult to convince a party to participate in a partnership if doing so may damage its reputation.
Throughout this paper we assume that the reputation and fundamental characteristics (in our case, the quality) of the reputation holder are nonseparable. This nonseparability limits the transferability or tradeability of reputations. For example, it may not be easy for a …rm whose products have performed poorly to buy customers' trust in its products. 31 Similarly, a well-known scholar cannot sell his or her reputation for producing high-quality research to another less-known scholar. There are certainly situations where reputations are separable and can therefore be traded. When reputations are embedded in names, the market for names corresponds to a market for reputations (e.g., Tadelis A …nal note about e¢ ciency. In our model, total expected surplus is higher when the joint project succeeds than when it fails, except in the obvious case where the joint project has zero value. Therefore, e¢ ciency considerations dictate that when individual implementation is possible, the higher-quality …rm is technically possible or even meaningful." 3 2 The assumption that …rms'reputations and qualities are separable is also implicit in the literature on brand extension (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988; Cabral, 2000) , which associates reputations with brands. Thus, by launching a new product under a totally new brand, a …rm associates its quality to that product, but not its existing reputation.
should always implement the joint project alone in order to maximize its probability of success. Our results indicate that in equilibrium this is often not the case. Thus, …rms'reputational concerns engender ine¢ cient project implementation decisions.
Appendices
A.1. A lower quality partners equilibrium (when only joint implementation is possible)
Here we present an example of a lower quality partners equilibrium when only joint implementation of the joint project is possible. We consider a case where …rms' qualities can take any value in the interval . This is because consumers know that in equilibrium the higher the quality of a …rm, the lower the maximum allowed quality of a partner.
This negative correlation dominates the e¤ ect of the variance of e q A in (3.4) (which in this example is 0:08 449), generating an ex-post reputation of …rm A that is higher when the joint project fails than when it succeeds. Speci…cally, these reputations are r 00 A (f ) = 0:717 93 (which is greater than the interim reputation) and r 00 A (s) = 0:643 54, respectively. Thus, in this equilibrium …rms' reputations decrease relative to the initial reputations. Firm A is better o¤ in terms of reputation when the joint project fails than when it succeeds. As a result, …rms implement the joint project only when they expect the joint project to succeed with a low probability, i.e., only when their qualities are low. We represent graphically the …rms'equilibrium implementation strategy in Figure 2 .
A.2. Proofs and auxiliary results
First we show that when individual implementation of the joint project is not possible, a lower quality partners equilibrium can exist only if V > 0, and a lower quality partners equilibrium in which the reputation of …rm i 2 fA;Bg decreases following a success of the joint project can exist only if i < V i =(V A + V B ). i (') = E q i fE[e q i j '; q i ] j 'g. Thus, su¢ cient conditions for the results in the Lemma are that given implementation strategy 1 (q) (respectively 2 (q)), E[e q i j s; q i ] > r i (resp. E[e q i j f; q i ] < r i ) for all q i such that h 2 (q j' ) > 0 for some q i . E[e q i j '; q i ] is the expected value of e q i according to the ex-post conditional distribution of e q i given q i . Denoting the density associated with this conditional distribution by h 2 (q i j'; q i ), by the law of conditional probabilities we have that
where h 2; i (q i j' ) = R h 2 (q j' )dq i denotes the ex-post marginal distribution of e q i . Therefore, from (4.2) it follows that given an implementation strategy (q),
Suppose …rst that (q) = (q). Fix q i such that (q) > 0 for some q i . (This implies that given q i ,
and (q) is non-decreasing in q i (recall that (q) = 0 if q i Proof of Lemma 1. By de…nition,
Because H 2 (q j' ) is obtained through Bayes rule from H 1 (q), it follows that
Applying this result in (6.3) and using standard integration properties, we can write The results in the Lemma follow by subtracting r 0 i from both sides of (6.5) and (6.6), and using the fact that var(e y) = E(e y 2 ) E 2 (e y) and cov(e y 1 ; e y 2 ) = E(e y 1 e y 2 ) E(e y 1 )E(e y 2 ) for any given random variables e y, e y 1 , and e y 2 .
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by introducing some additional notation. . By the law of iterated expectations we can write r 0 i = E q i fE[e q i j q i ]g. Thus, a su¢ cient condition for point (i) of the Proposition to hold is that in any higher quality partners equilibrium, E[e q i j q i ] r i for all q i such that h 1 (q) > 0 for some q i . The E[e q i j q i ] is the expected value of e q i according to the interim conditional distribution of e q i given q i . Denote the density associated with this conditional distribution by h 1 (q i jq i ). By the law of conditional probabilities
where
Consider an equilibrium where …rms'implementation strategy is (q). From (6.9) and (4.1), it follows that in this equilibrium
Fix q i such that (q) > 0 for some q i . (This implies that given q i , h 1 (q) > 0 for some q i .) Because (q) is non-decreasing in q i in a higher quality partners equilibrium (recall that in this type of equilibrium Point (iii) of the Proposition, which is equivalent to the statement that in a higher quality partners equilibrium r 00 i (s) > r i for all i 2 fA;Bg, follows directly from Lemma 3 in Appendix A.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose that V = V B = 0. Let g , for all j 2 f1; 2g. Furthermore, let z j denote the lowest combined quality threshold level above which …rms implement the joint project in a higher quality partners equilibrium when the prior distribution of …rm B's quality is g j B , for all j 2 f1; 2g. Note that a higher quality partners equilibrium exists, since V = 0 (see Proposition 2).
The fact that z j is the combined quality threshold above which …rms'implement the joint project in a higher quality partners equilibrium implies, by de…nition of equilibrium, that n j (z j ) = z j , where n j (z) [r A r 00 A;z;j (f )] [r 00
A;z;j (s) r 00 A;z;j (f )]
. Furthermore, the fact that z j corresponds to the lowest of such combined quality threshold levels when the prior distribution of …rm B's quality is g . This implies that n 2 (z) > n 1 (z) for all z such that both the numerator and the denominator of n 2 (z) and n 1 (z) are positive.
Thus, n 2 (z) > n 1 (z) for all z 2 [0; minfz 1 ; z 2 g]. This implies that z 1 < z 2 , since z j must satisfy n j (z j ) = z j , for all j 2 f1; 2g. This establishes the result in the Proposition. The case in which we focus here is a special case of a more general result. In fact, it can be shown that if distributions g 
Proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose that an equilibrium where …rms form a partnership regardless of their qualities exists. In such an equilibrium, the decision to form a partnership is uninformative to consumers about …rms'qualities. This implies that r 0 i = r i , for all i 2 fA;Bg. Consider …rst the case of …rms with qualities q = (0; 0) in this equilibrium. Firms'joint pro…t if they form a partnership, which is equal to Clearly, conditions (6.11) and (6.14) cannot hold simultaneously. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a higher quality partners equilibrium. Firms'expected joint pro…t if they form a partnership and implement the joint project is given by 
